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The practice of prenatal screening is undergoing important changes as a
result of the introduction of genomic testing technologies at different stages
of the screening trajectory. It is expected that eventually it will become
possible to routinely obtain a comprehensive ‘genome scan’ of all fetuses.
Although this will still take several years, there are clear continuities
between present developments and this future scenario. As this review
shows, behind the still limited scope of screening for common aneuploidies,
a rapid widening of the range of conditions tested for is already taking shape
at the invasive testing stage. But the continuities are not just technical; they
are also ethical. If screening for Down’s syndrome is a matter of providing
autonomous reproductive choice, then why would providing the choice to
have a full fetal genome scan be something entirely different? There is a
clear need for a sustainable normative framework that will have to answer
three challenges: the indeterminateness of the autonomy paradigm, the need
to acknowledge the future child as an interested stakeholder, and the
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It may seem that apart from better tests every decade
or so, prenatal screening for fetal abnormalities has not
changed much since its introduction in the last quar-
ter of the past century. However, behind the scenes,
the contours of a revolution are taking shape. The two
main ingredients for this are already present, although
still at distinct stages of the screening trajectory: the
use of cell-free DNA (cfDNA) from maternal plasma
for non-invasive testing for common aneuploidies and
the use of high-resolution genomic technologies at the
follow-up stage. As there is proof of principle that the
whole fetal genome can be sequenced from cfDNA,
the fusing of these developments into a scenario of
non-invasive comprehensive genomic screening seems
only a matter of time. In this ethics-oriented review,
we show that this prospect challenges the normative
framework that over the past decades has been developed
for prenatal screening for fetal abnormalities. Interest-
ingly, much of the contours of the future of the practice
(broad-scope, undirected, multipurpose screening) can
already be discerned in routine prenatal ultrasound, an
instance of prenatal screening that to some extent has
always defied this framework.
The set-up of this review is as follows. First, we will
discuss the reasoning behind the normative framework:
the set of aims and principles and norms that together
provide ethical guidance to the current practice of prena-
tal screening. Second, we will give a background sketch
of current practice (genomic as well as ultrasound screen-
ing) and developments. The next three sections are about
ethical issues arising at distinct stages in the revolution
starting with non-invasive prenatal testing (NIPT) and
potentially leading to some form of broad-scope fetal
genome scanning in the midterm future.
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Normative framework
In general medical discourse, ‘screening’ refers to the
use of a specific type of test: a test that does not
provide a final diagnosis. In health policy discourse, by
contrast, the distinguishing characteristic of ‘screening’
is that medical tests of whatever nature are systematically
offered on the initiative of medical or public health
professionals to an as-yet unburdened population (1).
In this review, we will use the term ‘screening’ in this
wider practice-oriented understanding of the term, unless
indicated otherwise. Screening in this sense can take the
form of large-scale population screening programmes set
up by public health authorities, but may also consist of
routine test offers by individual practitioners.
As screening in this sense is an unrequested offer, there
should be evidence that the potential benefits outweigh
the risk of harms that screening always also entails. The
normative framework for responsible screening, as ini-
tially developed in the 1960s by Wilson & Jungner and
refined and adapted ever since (1, 2), insists that not only
should there be a suitable test (in terms of clinical validity
and predictive value) but also that the early detection of
the targeted conditions should have a clear clinical utility,
mostly understood in terms of opportunities for treatment
or prevention. Participation in screening should be vol-
untary and those to whom screening is offered should
be assisted in making an informed decision. Moreover,
where screening is paid for from public funds, the tar-
get condition should be an important health problem and
funding requires justification in the context of total health
care spending.
From a normative perspective, there are two main
types of prenatal screening: (i) screening for conditions
(e.g. infectious diseases, blood group sensitization, etc.)
that may lead to an unfavorable pregnancy outcome and
where early detection enables timely treatment or pre-
vention and (ii) screening for fetal abnormalities (such
as Down’s syndrome) where early detection allows for
no other options but the choice either to prepare for a
child with a serious handicap or health problem or to
request termination of pregnancy. The former of these
two types makes an ethically unproblematic fit with the
general screening framework’s requirement of clinical
utility. But what is the utility of prenatal screening for
untreatable conditions such as Down’s syndrome? Some
have suggested that there is not really a difference here
(3, 4). For instance, in the early days of setting up pre-
natal screening programmes, Stein et al. argued that it
was desirable from a public health perspective to aim for
an ‘almost total prevention of Down’s syndrome (… )
by screening all pregnant women’ (5). This ‘prevention’
account of the clinical utility of prenatal screening has
led to strong moral criticism (6). The objections are
twofold. First, turning selective abortion into a public
health tool may lead to women being subtly pressured
into making the ‘right’ decisions. This would be at odds
with respecting abortion decisions as morally sensitive
and ultimately personal choices (2). Second, according
to what is known as the ‘disability rights’ or ‘expres-
sivist critique’, prenatal screening sends a discriminatory
message about the worth of the lives of people living with
the relevant conditions (7). In order to avoid these moral
challenges, official accounts provide a different reading
of what prenatal screening is about. Internationally, gov-
ernment documents and websites of public health author-
ities (such as e.g. the British National Screening Com-
mittee) state that the aim of screening for fetal abnormal-
ities is to enable autonomous reproductive decision mak-
ing by individual women or couples. Although this has
not silenced the discussion about the acceptability of pre-
natal screening [with some commentators arguing that
individual choices invited by the screening offer may still
be seen as ‘eugenic’ (8, 9)], the ‘autonomy paradigm’
is at the core of a widely shared consensus that prenatal
screening serves a morally acceptable aim.
Clearly, if this is to be more than window dressing, it
requires practices that reflect this atypical aim (auton-
omy rather than prevention) in every aspect of how the
screening is presented, offered, carried out, and eval-
uated (6). For instance, it means that information and
counseling should as much as possible be non-directive
and aimed at assisting women in making an ‘informed
choice’ (10). Moreover, the autonomy aim can only be
meaningfully upheld in a society where adequate levels
of care are available for people with the relevant condi-
tions and where those who choose to have a child with
special needs are not held responsible for imposing a bur-
den on society (11).
Current practice and developments
In the past decades, the practice of prenatal screening
for genomic abnormalities has changed only slightly.
The focus was mainly on Down’s syndrome (trisomy
21) and other common aneuploidies (trisomy 13 and 18)
were added later. Countries with formal screening pro-
grammes for these conditions use a two-tiered approach.
The first line test (combined first trimester screening;
cFTS) consists of biochemical markers in maternal blood
combined with an ultrasound assessment of the fetal
nuchal translucency (NT) at 11–14 weeks. Women with
a risk above a cut-off of e.g. 1:150 or 1:200, or with an
enlarged NT, are offered a diagnostic test (karyotyping or
molecular genotyping) in chorionic villi or amniotic fluid
cells, obtained by invasive means. At a false-positive
rate of 5%, cFTS-based screening is reported to detect
82–87% cases of trisomy 21 (12). In most countries,
pregnant women are also offered a routine ultrasound
‘fetal anomaly scan’ in the second trimester (between
18 and 21 weeks). The main focus is on major structural
anomalies, the finding of which may require early post-
natal intervention, allow prenatal treatment or be a reason
for the woman to ask for termination of pregnancy (13).
Routine ultrasound may also detect minor abnormalities,
including small and often transient structural changes
(soft markers) that are associated with a higher risk of
aneuploidies.
Recent years have seen some important developments.
One is the introduction of NIPT either as a second-
or first-tier screening test for common aneuploidies.
NIPT is based on (different approaches to) sequencing
532
Genomic futures of prenatal screening
of cfDNA in maternal blood, about 10% of which is of
placental origin (14, 15). As a test for common aneu-
ploidies, NIPT has much better test characteristics than
cFTS, not just in populations with a moderate or high
a priori risk for the tested conditions but also in a gen-
eral risk population. In the recent large-scale prospective
NEXT study, all trisomy 21 cases were detected at a
false-positive rate of 0.06% (16). However, the positive
predictive value of NIPT (80.9% in the same study) for
this condition, although much better than that of cFTS
(3.4%, 16), is not high enough for considering a positive
NIPT result a final diagnosis. In many cases, this has a
biological cause including confined placental mosaicism
or an undetected vanishing twin (15). The main benefit
of NIPT is that because of its much lower false-positive
rate, the need for invasive follow-up procedures can be
massively reduced as compared with cFTS. As these
procedures entail a miscarriage risk (often estimated at
around 0.5–1%), this also makes prenatal screening con-
siderably safer and hence less harmful (17). In several
countries, individual practices have started offering com-
mercially available NIPT as a further option next to exist-
ing prenatal screening tests, initially only to women at
a known moderate or high risk, but more recently also
as an alternative first-tier screening test to a general risk
population, very often at the request of pregnant women
themselves. This scenario has the further advantage of
reducing the number of false negatives and providing
early (and highly reliable) reassurance to women receiv-
ing a favorable result. However, as long as NIPT is still
considerably more costly than cFTS, financial barriers
stand in the way of implementing NIPT as a first-tier test
in countries where prenatal screening is offered as a pub-
lic health service.
A second development is the introduction of chromo-
some microarray (CMA) in prenatal follow-up testing,
especially but not exclusively after detection of enlarged
NT or other ultrasound abnormalities. CMA is based
on either comparative genomic hybridization (CGH)
or single nucleotide polymorphism (SNP) analysis and
allows targeted or genome-wide testing for copy number
variants (CNVs) that cannot be seen with conventional
karyotyping (18). This gives a higher yield of clinically
relevant abnormalities, including microdeletion and
microduplication syndromes. Genome-wide CMA may
also lead to findings of clinical significance not related
to the ultrasound abnormalities that prompted further
testing, or to variants considered benign or of unclear
clinical significance (19, 20).
Ethics of current prenatal screening practices
With the better test characteristics of NIPT, prenatal
screening for fetal abnormalities can better achieve its
aim. As research among pregnant women suggests,
a more robust test renders prenatal screening more
acceptable for more women, including for those who
would regard a positive result as sufficiently informative
to prepare themselves for the birth of a child with special
needs (21). However, it is also feared that precisely
the greater accuracy and safety of NIPT-based prenatal
screening may lead to it being presented and regarded
as a routine procedure, rather than as an option that
well-informed women may either accept or decline (22,
23). Specific ethical issues emerge in debates related
to the scope of testing with NIPT (24). These include
the clinical importance of a possibly lower yield of
findings beyond common aneuploidies as compared to
screening with cFTS followed by fetal genotyping in
case of a high-risk result (25, 26), the best way to deal
with additional findings of NIPT itself (27), and whether
or not to take the step to expand NIPT-based screening
to include sex chromosomal (28) and submicroscopic
chromosome abnormalities (29, 30).
Routine prenatal ultrasound differs from screening for
common aneuploidies in not being targeted to a limited
number of serious and non-treatable abnormalities. It is
a form of undirected screening, detecting a broad range
of abnormalities ranging from serious and non-treatable
to milder conditions and conditions that allow for prena-
tal or postnatal intervention. This makes for an uneasy
fit with the normative frameworks summarized earlier.
First, the criteria of the general Wilson & Jungner frame-
work presuppose screening being directed at specific and
well-defined disorders. The reason for this is that the
balance of benefits and harms of undirected screening
is more difficult to define. However, the nature of the
technology implies that everything that can be seen on
an ultrasound scan will be seen. Second, routine ultra-
sound cannot be exclusively attributed to either one of
the two main types of prenatal screening, as it is a test
for both untreatable fetal anomalies and conditions rel-
evant to improving pregnancy outcomes for mother and
child. Third, the broad scope of possible findings makes
adequate pretest information and counseling for routine
ultrasound an important challenge.
It is perhaps remarkable that the obvious tensions
between routine ultrasound and the autonomy paradigm
have not led to much ethical debate. Part of the expla-
nation may be that routine ultrasound is more than only
a screening test. For professionals, it is also a pregnancy
monitoring tool, whereas pregnant women value the scan
as a first opportunity to ‘see the baby’. This may have
contributed to routine ultrasound being regarded more as
an ‘exception confirming the rule’ than as a real chal-
lenge to the autonomy paradigm.
Follow-up testing as a gray area between diagnosis
and screening
Invasive follow-up testing after a positive initial screen-
ing test (cFTS, NT, NIPT, or routine ultrasound) can
be understood in two different ways. First, it is clinical
diagnostic testing that should as far as possible be tar-
geted to finding a diagnosis explaining the abnormal test
result. Second, in addition to finding a diagnosis, inva-
sive follow-up testing provides an ideal opportunity for
further screening by also looking for abnormalities that
cannot (yet) be screened for with non-invasive means. As
we will show, these different views can be traced in sev-
eral contemporary debates about the scope of follow-up
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testing, with the latter view fueling the thrust toward an
ever-wider testing.
Some years ago, it was discussed whether in preg-
nancies with a positive cFTS (but without abnormal
ultrasound findings) or at a higher risk for fetal aneu-
ploidy because of maternal age, karyotyping should be
replaced by the then new Rapid Aneuploidy Diagnostic
(RAD) test, such as quantitative fluorescent-polymerase
chain reaction (QF-PCR) (31). The argument for doing
so was that while karyotyping inevitably leads to inci-
dental findings (other chromosomal abnormalities than
the common aneuploidies tested for at the screening
stage), RAD allows to largely avoid this, thus also avoid-
ing the difficult counseling and decision making associ-
ated with karyotypes of unclear prognosis. The maxim
behind this approach has been summarized as ‘test what
you screen for’ (32). The prevailing view, however, is
that this denies prospective parents relevant information
about abnormalities with potential clinical significance
that they might consider a reason for abortion (33).
More recently, the debate has shifted to whether new
molecular technologies should be used to look for more
rather than less than can be found with traditional kary-
otyping (31). There seems to be a growing support for
the position that microarrays should not be limited to
pregnancies with ultrasound abnormalities (see below),
but be used to maximize the yield of invasive testing
also in pregnancies with an elevated aneuploidy risk
(based on abnormal cFTS/NIPT results or on maternal
age), but without ultrasound abnormalities. Pointing to
the about 1% more clinically relevant findings in this
population as compared to traditional karyotyping, the
authors of a recent review state that ‘on a population
level, this represents a large number of cases where clin-
ically relevant copy number changes will go undetected
if microarray technology is applied only to fetuses with
an abnormal ultrasound’. They suggest that ‘once the
invasive procedure has been carried out then microar-
ray should be the frontline test once aneuploidies have
been excluded by other methodologies (e.g. QF-PCR)’
(34). These quotes are revealing: instead of considering
a normal RAD result as completing the screening trajec-
tory in fetuses with normal anatomy, the idea is that this
should be a starting point for further screening. The fact
that invasive testing risks have already been considered
is presented both as an opportunity and a justification to
look beyond common aneuploidies.
In pregnancies with first or second trimester ultrasound
abnormalities, the use of microarrays instead of kary-
otyping is an accepted practice (35). But there is much
debate about microarray design, in terms of coverage of
genomic regions (targeted or genome-wide arrays) and
resolution (36), as well as about policies for reporting
secondary findings and findings of uncertain significance
(35, 37). Here again, it can be asked how the use of this
technology as a follow-up to screening should be under-
stood: is it (only) aimed at obtaining a diagnosis that
explains the ultrasound abnormality or (also) at screening
for further abnormalities not related to that finding? (38).
But things are different here from confirmatory testing
after aneuploidy screening in two respects. First, when
finding an explanation for an abnormal ultrasound, it
may not be clear where in the genome to look for the
cause of the (often syndromic) problem (or problems).
This may require broad-scope testing for what is still a
diagnostic purpose, very similar to how in the postnatal
setting, microarrays or more recently also whole-exome
sequencing is used to find a genetic diagnosis in patients
presenting with complex phenotypes. As is also the case
in the postnatal setting, this makes it difficult to draw
a firm line not only between what is still diagnosis and
what should be regarded as additional screening but also
between what is still clinical testing and what should
be regarded as research (38). Second, unlike after ane-
uploidy screening, ‘looking for more’ at follow-up is
continuous with the scope of the preceding screening
step. Given that routine ultrasound already screens for
whatever can be found that is clinically relevant, looking
beyond an explanation for a specific ultrasound abnor-
mality does not seem to amount to doing something
different.
In sum, the thrust of these debates and developments
is toward wider testing at the follow-up stage, partly
reflecting the fact that targeted testing may not always
suffice to find a diagnosis, but partly also as a deliberate
move to use what is formally diagnosis as a platform for
broad-scope screening for clinically relevant abnormal-
ities that would otherwise go undetected. Although this
may as well be driven by scientific interests, the implicit
justification seems that not using the opportunity to find
more abnormalities rather than less amounts to provid-
ing suboptimal care to women who have already agreed
to prenatal testing.
From an ethical point of view, the following con-
siderations are relevant. First, ‘changing the game’
from diagnostic testing to screening requires explicit
informed consent (39). Ideally, possible options to
broaden follow-up testing into further screening should
be briefly discussed prior to aneuploidy or ultrasound
screening, in order to avoid women being drawn into
what they may experience as a screening trap. Even if
most pregnant women do indeed want to know about
other clinically relevant abnormalities and appreciate
the benefits of further screening (40), it does not follow
that individual women need not be asked about their
preferences in this regard (41).
Second, the large majority of women who do not
undergo invasive testing are de facto excluded from
access to this further round of screening. It is expected
that time will close this gap between screening at the
pre- and post-invasive testing stages as a result of further
improvement and validation of NIPT as a test for clin-
ically relevant abnormalities beyond common aneuploi-
dies (28). For the time being, however, the opportunistic
character of further screening at the follow-up stage cre-
ates a differential access issue. Although this need not
be unacceptable, ideally all pregnant women should be
allowed to benefit from the same screening offer (42).
Finally, it seems a logical next step to use
next-generation sequencing (NGS) for comprehensive
genome scanning in all fetuses that undergo invasive
prenatal testing, as soon as doing so is technically,
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logistically, and financially feasible. This will make
it possible to test the fetus for an even wider array of
genetic conditions and risk factors. And given proof
of principle regarding the analysis of the entire fetal
genome in maternal plasma (43, 44), it is to be expected
that this will not remain confined to the invasive testing
stage. Clearly, there is no good reason why prenatal
genetic screening should remain limited to Down’s syn-
drome or to the three common trisomies. And indeed,
ultrasound is already a much wider form of screening.
However, is the fact that we can soon test the fetus
‘for everything’, including for later onset disorders and
risk factors for common diseases, a sufficient reason
for doing so? If the dynamics of the field is not to be
determined by the ‘technological imperative’, a debate
about the scope of prenatal screening is urgently needed
(45, 46).
Broad-scope genomic prenatal screening and the
normative framework
What then should the scope of future prenatal screening
be? Surprisingly, the normative framework does not help
answer this question. Or perhaps this is not surprising at
all, as the framework was designed to answer different
challenges than those arising with broad-scope genomic
screening. We identify three main problems with the cur-
rent framework: the indeterminateness of the autonomy
paradigm (see section below), its blindness for the auton-
omy rights of the future child (see section below), and the
need to adapt to the reality of irreducible double purpose
screening (see section below).
All about choice?
In the debate about the scope of testing and reporting
policies at the follow-up stage, a powerful trump card
is that many pregnant women want to know ‘as much
as possible’, including about non-actionable late-onset
conditions and information with uncertain implications
(40, 47), and that taking autonomy seriously entails pro-
viding this information to those who might want it.
‘If it is all about choice, then, no option or informa-
tion potentially relevant to a woman’s choice and her
decision-making processes should be withheld’ (37). The
quote is revealing of what seems the dominant interpre-
tation of the autonomy paradigm as currently understood
in the field: that it is about maximizing unqualified repro-
ductive choice.
However, as has been pointed out by several commen-
tators (6, 9, 11), ‘pure reproductive autonomy’, in the
sense of enabling prospective parents to make whatever
reproductive choices they find important, cannot be the
aim of a screening programme offered and funded as
a public health service. Wilkinson uses the example of
sex selection to make this point (9). But of course, ‘pure
autonomy’ was not envisaged at the time of those earlier
prevention-vs-autonomy debates. At that time, ‘enabling
autonomous choice’ had the much more limited mean-
ing of allowing pregnant women and their partners to
decide for themselves whether or not they wanted a test
for Down’s syndrome (and perhaps a very small num-
ber of other conditions). As the scope was fixed and as
this determined the range of possible choices, this was
not ‘pure’ but qualified autonomy. The aim was to pro-
vide autonomous choices related to the possible birth of
a child with a serious disorder, where ‘serious’ should be
understood in terms of consequences for the well-being
not only of the child but also of the parents and the fam-
ily as a whole (11). The reason why such qualifications
remained largely implicit in the past decades is that with
the still limited scope of prenatal screening, there was
no need to spell out further criteria. Now that this has
changed, some have argued that instead of upholding
what seems an incoherent aim, we should normalize pre-
natal screening by biting the bullet and accept that at least
one of its goals is to bring down the birth prevalence
of disorders with a high burden of disease, not just for
the parents but also for the society (9). The alternative
is to see if and how the autonomy paradigm can indeed
be qualified in a way that would allow it to meaning-
fully determine the clinical utility of prenatal screening
as a public health service (46). This would have to refer
to individual choices recognized as important enough to
qualify as a public health issue.
Of course, prenatal screening need not be offered and
funded as a public health service. In many countries,
but in quite some others, it is an offer available to
paying clients of individual practitioners or practices.
Some have argued that precisely if we want to take the
criticism seriously that any offer of prenatal screening for
specific disorders or abnormalities is implicitly directive
and sends a discriminatory message, the only acceptable
alternative is to move the practice outside the realm of
public health to the private sector, where screening can
be offered without restrictions (48, 49). However, this
position comes at a moral price as it creates inequality
between those who can and cannot afford to pay for
screening.
A more general problem with a maximizing interpre-
tation of the autonomy paradigm arises regardless of
whether screening is offered in a public health or a private
care setting. The idea of giving women an ‘individualized
choice’ to opt for a maximum of genomic information if
that is what they want (40) will lead to information over-
load and thus paradoxically undermine rather than serve
or enhance reproductive autonomy (50, 51). In related
debates about the use of NGS in postnatal health care
and research, it has been proposed as a possible solution
for this problem to give pretest information a more gen-
eral character that would avoid information overload by
presenting general categories or types of possible out-
comes, differentiated in view of their implications for
health and well-being (52). Ideally, this would also allow
those tested to decide prior to testing about which out-
comes they do and do not want to be informed (42).
However, there is still a clear need to test such alter-
native models of informed consent in empirical studies
in different settings. From an ethical point of view, the
main question remains how informed (or uninformed)
such ‘generic consent’ would be.
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Broad-scope prenatal screening and the interests of the
future child
Broad-scope prenatal screening brings a new stakeholder
on the stage: the future person, whose interests in being
protected against psychosocial and informational harm
have not until now played a role in the ethics of prenatal
screening (42, 53). It is time for this to change, given
that broad-scope prenatal screening will also lead to
information that (if not used for an abortion) may have a
negative benefit-to-harm ratio for the child.
With regard to high-penetrance mutations for later
onset disorders, several current guidelines maintain that
testing children from affected families for such condi-
tions is problematic unless there are effective treatments
or opportunities for prevention that have to be started dur-
ing childhood (54, 55). The concern is that such testing
will do the child more harm than good, while also fore-
closing his or her right to choose at a later age between
knowing and not knowing. Using a term coined by the
American philosopher Feinberg, this has been referred
to as a possible violation of the child’s ‘right to an
open future’ (56). This is an ethical concept express-
ing the intuition that respect for children as future per-
sons requires safeguarding their future autonomy (57).
Some have argued that the ‘best interests of the child’ is
the more appropriate moral currency here, as it includes
but is not limited to the child’s autonomy interests (58).
Either way, the concern behind those guidelines has been
taken up in debates about the scope of NGS-based pre-
natal and neonatal screening as well (45, 59–61).
On the same line of reasoning, the balance of ben-
efits and harms related to other possible outcomes of
broad-scope screening (including phenotypically mild
conditions, genetic risk factors for common disorders,
susceptibilities for behavioral characteristics) should at
least be further explored prior to considering active pre-
natal screening for those conditions (45). For instance,
starting one’s life with a diagnosed condition that oth-
erwise might have remained unnoticed over a lifetime
may be beneficial in so far as such findings lead to bet-
ter care. However, there may also be a potential for
psychosocial harm (e.g. diminished self-esteem, parental
over-protectiveness, and stigmatization) that needs to be
taken into account (45, 62).
The idea that the welfare or autonomy interests of
the future child may provide a reason for limiting the
scope of prenatal testing is not uncontested. It has been
argued that given a ‘basic right of reproductive choice
and parental autonomy, (… ) obtaining a fetus’s com-
plete genetic profile should be the parents’ choice’ (63).
There are two elements in this quote that require sep-
arate discussion: reproductive and parental autonomy.
Starting with the latter, the claim that (prospective) par-
ents have a right to their child’s complete genetic pro-
file seems to ignore that parental autonomy is rooted in
parental responsibility. What the concept means is that
parents are usually in the best position to see what is
in their children’s interests and that this is why profes-
sionals should normally respect the decisions that parents
make on behalf of their children, including in situations
where the child’s interest is unclear. However, in cases
where professionals have strong grounds for thinking
that parental choices would be harmful, they do have a
responsibility to protect the child they are treating. This
limits the extent to which professionals should respect
parental (non-)disclosure preferences (64). Parents can
claim neither a ‘right not-to-know’ with regard to find-
ings that are clearly beneficial (e.g. actionable childhood
disorders) nor a ‘right to know’ with regard to findings
at odds with the child’s welfare or autonomy interests
(non-actionable late-onset disorders).
But what about reproductive autonomy? Limiting the
scope of prenatal screening so as to avoid findings that
may harm the future child denies pregnant women the
option of using that same information for a possible
termination of pregnancy. Unlike the appeal to parental
autonomy, this is a real dilemma. It is not entirely new
although: in the specific context of prenatal diagnosis of
neurogenetic disorders (such as Huntington disease), a
form of ‘conditional access’ to testing (i.e. only for those
who intend to ask for termination in case of a positive
result) has been proposed as a possible solution (65,
66). However, this applies to targeted prenatal testing
in affected families, where such pretest agreements can
(to some extent) be meaningfully made. In the context
of broad-scope prenatal screening, the only way out is
to weigh the opposing interests. It would seem that the
interest of the future child not to be sent into the world
with a complete genome scan already done is the more
weighty consideration here.
Double purpose screening
Broad-scope NGS-based screening may become the
genomic equivalent of routine prenatal ultrasound. Sim-
ilar to ultrasound, it will lead to identification of both
untreatable abnormalities and conditions that enable
adapted care or an adapted delivery setting. Increas-
ingly, this will also include options for fetal therapy.
Bianchi refers to this scenario as follows: ‘Historically,
the goal of prenatal diagnosis has been to provide an
informed choice to prospective parents. We are now at
a point where that goal can and should be expanded to
incorporate genetic, genomic and transcriptomic data to
develop new approaches to fetal treatment.’ (67). But it
would seem more appropriate to say that this further aim
of opening up preventive and therapeutic options raises
questions about parental and professional responsibility
that cannot simply be accounted for under the autonomy
paradigm. Also in this respect, broad-scope screening is
like routine prenatal ultrasound, whose undirected char-
acter and irreducible double purpose have always chal-
lenged the normative framework. What has long been an
exception may thus become the rule. How to deal with
this tension? As the benefits for pregnant women and
their future children are potentially large, it can be argued
that we need a revised ethical framework that moves
beyond the strict compartmentalization of autonomy-
and prevention-aimed screening without ignoring the
ethical considerations behind this distinction (46).
Clearly, a central element of this new ethical framework
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will have to be the relationship between the pregnant
woman’s reproductive autonomy on the one hand and (if
she decides to carry the pregnancy to term) her respon-
sibility for the future child on the other (68). This will
need to be fine-tuned, taking account of medical data
and variables regarding for instance the magnitude of
harms to be prevented, the effectiveness as well as pos-
sible burdens and risks of (experimental) therapies, and
maternal and future children’s interests. This will also
require a further determination of relevant professional
responsibilities: to what extent should information about
double purpose screening be non-directive? Especially
with regard to conditions for which prenatal therapy
would be possible, there is a risk of disproportionally
subordinating the freedom and interests of the pregnant
women to the potential interests of the future child (46).
Conclusion
The still narrow scope of prenatal screening for chro-
mosomal abnormalities should not deceive us: the era
of broad-scope genomic prenatal screening is already
unfolding at the invasive testing stage. The next steps
toward a non-invasive comprehensive fetal genome scan
seem only limited by the current state of the technology
and costs. While this makes it an urgent question what
prenatal screening should be offered for and why, the
current ethical framework is unable to answer this ques-
tion. In view of the dynamics of the field, there is a need
for a revised framework able to guide the broadening of
the scope of prenatal screening in a way that focuses
on providing meaningful reproductive choices, while
respecting the informational interests of the future child,
and acknowledging that broad-scope genomic prenatal
screening will be like prenatal ultrasound in not easily
fitting the distinction between autonomy and prevention.
In the light of these challenges and the urgent need for
further ethical reflection, it seems wise not for the time
being to expand the scope of prenatal genomic screening
beyond serious congenital and childhood-onset disorders
(24, 46). Clearly, this is already a huge step beyond cur-
rent aneuploidy screening that will require careful con-
sideration of all relevant aspects, including the comple-
mentarity of screening at the prenatal and preconception
stages (46). As carrier screening prior to pregnancy pro-
vides couples with more reproductive options and more
time for reflection, this should be integrated in a broader
debate about the future of reproductive (rather than only
prenatal) screening.
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